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Administering Systemic Risk vs. Administering Justice: 
What can we do now that we agreed to pay differences? 
 
 
Professor Stout brilliantly addresses both the ideological content of economics and a real-world 
problem at the same time. On the ideological side, Professor Stout recalls the time where the first 
“economists” gave a fresh new look on a matter that belonged so far to ethics. Bernard Mandeville 
and Adam Smith derailed the pre-Enlightenment common sense, showing that socially useful action 
should not necessarily derive from virtue. Hence their paradoxical praise of greediness and 
speculation that, if morally abject, benefited the commonwealth. Their demonstration inherited 
somewhat of Machiavelli’s provocative rhetoric: since then, morality argument seemed irrelevant in 
economics, and many a citizen was disappointed by how cynic economists can be. Professor Stout 
restored a moral perspective on economics, showing that not every form of greediness is useful: if 
“by pursuing his own interest” the speculator can contribute to the ruin of all; then such 
action should be reputed immoral. 
 
How immoral? Here’s the real-world problem: speculation, if fuelled only by disagreement about (the 
likelihood of) future events, leads to a zero-sum game that both distract workforce from socially 
useful activity and raises systemic risk. As a ban on derivative instruments would deter the “useful” 
speculation, Professor Stout suggest to raise the common law tradition, where the gains arising from 
pure betting are not publicly enforceable. In the end, something of this tradition could be 
recognized in the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
I must confess I fully agree with the first part of the demonstration – economic paradoxes can 
obscure a problem as much as individual morality, we cannot be satisfied with a partial equilibrium 
reasoning  – but I think some generality might be added to the second one. 
 
The demonstration that we should do something to prevent the collapse of the financial system 
might seem incomplete to economists, who are used to review articles surveying all theoretical 
arguments (Capelle-Blancard 2009), or empirical studies (Mayhew 2001). This is precisely where the 
argument is brilliant: as a priori reasoning about speculation is inconclusive, the point is whether 
disagreement based speculation is now a risk of systemic significance. Professor Stout suggests a measure of 
“speculation systemic riskiness” as a leverage ratio (notional amount of derivatives contracts divided 
by amount outstanding of underlying). The current value of this measure shows the underlying risk 
is covered more than 4 times. This suggests that derivatives are not used as insurance, but for 
speculation of the perverse kind (i. e. disagreement based). Unfortunately, Stulz [2004], p. 178-9 has 
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shown how the notional amount can be biased. The measure cannot then be reputed fully reliable, 
although it indicates that moral hazard produced by individual speculative behaviors (of firms and people) are of 
systemic significance. 
 
Once we agreed on that premise, Professor Stout cites the common law principle not to enforce 
debts that derive from bets. In fact, this is not just a common law principle: it is a general law principle 
in Western Europe since the Roman Republic. As an example of continental law, the French Code 
Civil featured the famous article 1965 - “the law does not enforce any debt related to gambling or 
betting” – which was opposed to derivative transactions resulting in “paying differences”. It should 
then be recalled that this “gambling exception” was relaxed earlier in continental Europe than in 
common law countries: (Riva-Lagneau Ymonet 2010) Italy in 1873-75; France in 1885; Germany in 
1896, the Netherlands in 1903 and the United Kingdom in 1909… and 1974 in the United States! 
How was it possible that the financially archaic countries of Europe relaxed the Roman law 
principles sooner? There is a simple answer: the underlying assets (stocks and bonds) on which to 
build up derivatives ought to be authorized first in Europe. As a consequence, Lagneau-Ymonet and 
Riva (2010) have shown that the 1885 reform in France played a significant role in adding liquidity 
and stabilizing the market after the turmoil of 1882. Why not then generalize this a priori 
authorization? Marteau and Morand (2010) asked whether one should 
“create an authority, such as the FDA in the United States, in charge of authorizing 
the emission of derivatives [in absence of clearing chamber or when the condition of 
replicating by arbitrage is impossible]” (p. 50-51) 
An alternative to the common law rule might then be an a priori decision of a relevant authority. 
 
This possibility has to be emphasized, because Professor Stout does not consider it. Moreover it is 
not a purely fictitious hypothesis: we all remember how the SEC forbade short selling in September 
2008, precisely to avoid destabilizing speculation against the banks. Then some countries maintained 
the ban to fight speculation against sovereign debt of states distressed by the financial crisis. As Riva 
and Lagneau Ymonet have shown, speculation using short selling is a special case of disagreement 
based speculation: a short seller communicates to the market that she evaluates the stock less than 
the buyer, but without implying that each holder of the same stock evaluates it at the same price (as 
it is theoretically the case in a “covered” transaction). The short seller takes her risky positions in 
order to make a profit by the repurchase at lesser cost, hence the short seller must find a holder who 
evaluates the stock at a lower price than the one of her sale. One can argue, then, that short selling, although 
is does look like a spot transaction, is in fact a special case of derivative trading (see e. g., FDA [2009] p. 7: 
“For example, a short position can be taken through single stock futures, index futures and options, 
spread bets, CFDs and total return swaps (based either on a particular share or on an index).”). 
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Agreeing to this statement only makes the question more compelling: why then forbid short selling 
and let the alternative derivative forms of trading continue? Why not ask for a preliminary 
authorization of every single derivative instrument (not traded via organized exchanges nor amenable 
to unambiguous marking to model)? 
 
Professor Stout overlooks that possibility and concentrates on the relics of the common law 
principle visible in the Dodd-Frank Act 
“the bill requires that swaps and other financial derivatives that do not hedge against 
a ‘commercial risk’ must be traded, if they are traded at all, on a registered exchange 
or a “clearinghouse” that performs a similar private enforcement function…” 
Although this looks like the old common law principle, it must be emphasized here that the modus 
operandi here is very different: the differences contract is valid and enforceable. Only the rise in 
transaction costs might deter perverse speculators1. Firms in need of a genuine hedge will be ready to 
pay for it, hence they might find as counterparty a speculator of the “useful” type. The principle is 
then used metaphorically. As in Europe, no court will have to decide whether differences should be 
paid: there is simply too much at stake (not just the value of a deal but the consequences for the 
whole industry of a court decision). In consideration of the potential consequences, the 
administration of justice, as inherited from the common law principle, has then been replaced by 
administration of systemic risk.  
 
In the current setup, the Financial Stability Oversight Council created by the Frank-Dodd Act has 
extended and discretionary powers to monitor both financial instruments (section 120) and financial 
corporations (section 113). Section 120 enables the Council to “provide for more stringent 
regulation of a financial activity by issuing recommendations to the primary financial regulatory 
agencies to apply new or heightened standards and safeguards”. Although this might seem vague, 
the interpretation by Skadden et al. is clearly that the Council might rule out a financial instrument by raising 
transaction costs. The termination issue is even explicitly addressed by section 115 as the Council might 
exact a “resolution plan”. One might then say that the Frank-Dodd Act is ahead of the Europeans’ 
expectations: instead of relying on one-shot prior authorization as called for by Marteau and 
Morand, the American regulation introduces a discretionary authority with hardly limited powers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See e. g. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom p. 55: “market participants could be affected by increased 
costs and increased regulatory oversight and reporting. The impact on some thinly capitalized, leveraged 
investment funds and structured finance vehicles could be significant and may make certain structures 
unfeasible.” 
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over instruments and firms. It might not be that easy to deal with both the responsibility for acting 
discretionarily and the “too big to fail” issue when acting a posteriori. No doubt that the typology of 
speculation and the common-law principle recalled by Professor Stout will prove extremely useful to 
vindicate the Council’s future interventions. 
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